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SOME "HARDSHIP":
DEFENDING A DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION SUIT UNDER THE
WISCONSIN FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The situation is likely not unfamiliar to an attorney practicing
employment law: an employer-client doing business in Wisconsin calls and
says that one of its employees has become sick or injured. The employee is
disabled, but wants to continue working. Careful to fulfill its legal
obligations, the employer is calling to confirm whether the disabled employee
is entitled to some workplace accommodations. While the attorney
undoubtedly appreciates the employer's vigilant watch over its potential legal
responsibilities, the attorney also appreciates that the employer is watching
the bottom line.
The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act' ("WFEA") governs the extent to
which an employer may be legally obligated to accommodate an individual's
disability for the purpose of integrating that individual into the workforce.2
These obligations have their costs. Surely the employer is concerned about
the price that accommodating the employee would pose, and rightfully so; the
potential costs for accommodating an employee are considerable. 3
1. WIS. STAT. §§ 111.31-.395 (2003-2004).
2. §§ 111.31-.395; see Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 2004 WI 90,
273 Wis. 2d 394, 682 N.W.2d 343. In addition to the WFEA, the Wisconsin Administrative Code,
Chapter DWD 218 contains various procedural statutes applicable to WFEA disability discrimination
claims. WIs. ADMIN. CODE D.W.D. §§ 218.01-218.24 (2003-2004).
3. The Job Accommodation Network found that eight percent of accommodations made cost
employers $2,001 to $5,000, while another four percent cost employers greater than $5,000. Job
Accommodation Network, Accommodation Benefit/Cost Data, http://www.jan.wvu.edu/media/Stats-
/BenCosts0799.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). The Job Accommodation Network is a service
provided by the Office of Disability Employment Policy of the U.S. Department of Labor that
monitors expenditures made under the WFEA's federal counterpart, the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"). 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2004). According to the Job Accommodation Network's
figures through 1999, twenty percent of employers provided accommodation at no cost, fifty-one
percent provided accommodation at a cost between $1 and $500, eleven percent between $501 and
$1,000, and three percent between $1,001 and $1,500, with a mean cost of $943. Job
Accommodation Network, Accommodation Benefit/Cost Data, http://www.jan.wvu.edu/media/Stats-
/BenCosts0799.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). When considering Congress's finding that forty-
three million Americans were physically or mentally disabled when the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 was passed, one can appreciate estimates that nation-wide accommodation requirements
could cost employers over ten billion dollars annually. Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line:
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Despite the costs to accommodate an employee, an employer is not
without some legislative protection. Specifically, an employer does not need
to provide an accommodation if it would pose a "hardship." On its face, this
term is an employer's key to alleviating the costly effects of the WFEA.
Unfortunately, the term is vacuous; it is undefined. A quarter of a century
after they were enacted, many of the WFEA's key provisions remain unclear.
"Reasonable accommodation" and "hardship" are the two most significant
examples.4 To complicate this lack of definition, the courts interpreting the
WFEA have done little to enflesh the statutes' bare bones. The result, then, is
a statutory morass through which effective navigation is usually tedious, and
sometimes unworkable. The WFEA thus does not have enough structure by
which employers can evaluate their legal responsibilities, let alone advocate
for their protection.
This Comment highlights ways in which the WFEA can be clarified to
provide employers a leg on which to stand when defending a WFEA disability
discrimination claim. In Part II, this Comment outlines the prominent
provisions of the WFEA to provide context for understanding a disability
discrimination claim. Then, Part III describes a dramatic change in
Wisconsin's disability discrimination law that has made hardship the focus of
a claim. This Part also contains an analysis of decisions interpreting the
hardship standard. Given the importance of the hardship standard in
Wisconsin, Part IV provides some guidance for further defining this standard,
which currently lacks a well-formed definition. Finally, Part V asks the courts
to develop a hardship standard that gives employers a chance to effectively
defend a disability discrimination action.
II. THE WISCONSIN FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
In 1981, the Wisconsin Legislature formally recognized the adverse
effects on "the general welfare of the state",5 when "[e]mployers . . . deny
employment opportunities and discriminate in employment against properly
qualified individuals solely because of their . . . disability."6 The WFEA
defines an "individual with a disability" as one who "[h]as a physical or
mental impairment which makes achievement unusually difficult or limits the
Determining When an Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes "Undue " Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 391, 396 (1995) (discussing the extent to which the ADA's
"undue hardship" standard is vague). Indeed, the consequences should be even more severe for small
businesses in Wisconsin; while the ADA covers only businesses with fifteen or more employees, the
WFEA covers any employer. WIS. STAT. § 111.32(6)(a) (2003-2004).
4. § 111.32.
5. § 111.31(l).
6. Id.
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capacity to work.",
7
To protect this class of individuals, the legislature enacted the WFEA "to
encourage and foster to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all
properly qualified individuals regardless . . . of disability."8  This is the
WFEA's main statement of policy-to equalize the hiring opportunities for all
individuals in the workforce. To this end, the legislature made unlawful the
refusal to "hire, employ.., any individual.., or to discriminate against any
individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment or labor organization membership because of [disability]." 9
A prohibition on discrimination is only the first step; to truly equalize
hiring opportunities for disabled individuals, employers must also
accommodate them. Accommodation is the WFEA's goal, and the statute
outlines an employer's duties to achieve that goal.' 0 The primary provisions
that establish the substantive rights and duties between parties to a WFEA
action are contained in section 111.34 of the Wisconsin Statutes."
Specifically, the rights and duties applicable to parties in a WFEA disability
discrimination suit stem from the interplay between two provisions, which are
as follows:
Disability; exceptions and special cases.
(1) Employment discrimination because of disability includes,
but is not limited to:
(b) Refusing to reasonably accommodate an
employee's or prospective employee's disability unless the
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would
pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or
business.
(2)(a) . . . [I]t is not employment discrimination
because of disability to refuse to hire, employ, admit or
license any individual, to bar or terminate from employment,
membership or licensure any individual, or to discriminate
against any individual in promotion, compensation or in
7. § 111.32(8)(a).
8. § 111.31(3). Under the WFEA, "disability" means "a physical or mental impairment which
makes achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity to work." § 111.32(8).
9. § 111.322(1).
10. See §§ 111.31-.395. In addition to the WFEA, the Wisconsin Administrative Code,
Chapter DWD 218 contains various procedural statutes applicable to WFEA disability discrimination
claims. Wis. ADMIN. CODE D.W.D. §§ 218.01-218.24 (2003-2004).
11. See §§ 111.31-.395.
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terms, conditions or privileges of employment if the disability
is reasonably related to the individual's ability to adequately
undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individual's
employment, membership, or licensure. 1
2
As these provisions indicate, the reasonable accommodations standard
requires mandatory expenditures by employers to help disabled individuals
assimilate into the workforce, provided those accommodations would not
work a hardship on the employer. 13
Once the substantive provisions that determine the rights and duties
applicable to a WFEA disability discrimination claim have been identified,
the parties must be allocated the burden of proving certain facts that trigger
the legal relationship.14 While "[t]he WFEA does not establish any specific
procedures for a complainant to follow in order to prove a case of
employment discrimination,'' 15 the courts have interpreted the WFEA to
involve a four-part system of burden shifting. The burdens are allocated as
follows: 16
A complainant employee must make a prima facie case that she is
disabled within the meaning of the WFEA, meaning the individual "[h]as a
physical or mental impairment which makes achievement unusually difficult
or limits the capacity to work' 17 and that an employer refused to, inter alia,
hire or employ the individual' 8 on the basis of the individual's disability 20
12. § 111.34.
13. Id.
14. See generally Currie v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 565 N.W.2d 253, 259
(Wis. 1997) ("[A] prima facie case triggers an intermediate burden of production for the employer,
rather than completely shifting the burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of discrimination to the
employer.").
15. Id. at 258.
16. The way in which the courts have characterized the relationship between sections
111 .34(1)(b) and (2)(a) has evolved throughout the last twenty years. Compare Crystal Lake Cheese
Factory v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 2003 WI 106, 32, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 32, 664 N.W.2d
651, 32 ("Taken together, § 11 1.34(l)(b) and (2)(a) require an employer to prove that even with
reasonable accommodations, the employee would not be able to perform his or her job
responsibilities adequately or that, where reasonable accommodations would enable the employee to
do the job, hardship would be placed on the employer.") (citing Target Stores v. Labor & Indus. Rev.
Comm'n, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998)) with McMullen v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n,
434 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (Cane, J., concurring) ("(S]ec. 111.34 imposes a three-
part test . . . : whether the employer has failed to accommodate the employee to a job-related
responsibility; whether the accommodation would be reasonable; and whether the accommodation
would pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise, or business.").
17. WIS. STAT. § 111.32(8) (2003-2004).
18. § 111.322.
19. § 111.321.
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If the employee makes her prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
employer to prove that "the disability is reasonably related to the individual's
ability to adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of that
individual's employment., 21 The burden then shifts to the employee to prove
that there was a reasonable accommodation that the employer refused to
provide.22
Finally, the burden shifts to the employer to prove one of two defenses:
"[E]ven with reasonable accommodations, the employee would not be able to
perform his or her job responsibilities adequately; '23 or the accommodation
would impose "hardship on ... [its] program, enterprise, or business. 24
These burdens establish that the complainant generally must come forth with
the majority of evidence in a disability discrimination case.25
While the terms reasonable accommodation and hardship are crucial to the
employer-employee relationship in the context of disability discrimination,
parties are left without clear meanings for those words-unlike the ADA,26
20. § 111.322; Crystal Lake, 2003 WI 106, 42, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 42, 664 N.W.2d 651, 42;
Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
"Individual with a disability" is defined, in pertinent part, as someone with "a physical or mental
impairment which ... limits the capacity to work." § I 1.32(8)(a). An adverse employment action
includes "refus[ing] to hire, employ, admit or license any individual ... or to discriminate against
any individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment or
labor organization membership because of [disability]." § 111.322(1).
21. § 11 1.34(2)(a); see Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 476 N.W.2d 707; Crystal Lake, 2003 WI 106,
42, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 42, 664 N.W.2d 651, 42 (allocating the burden for proving whether an
employee's disability is reasonably related to the individual's ability to undertake the job-related
responsibilities of the individual's employment, as required in section 11 1.34(2)(a) of the Wisconsin
Statutes).
22. 111.34(1)(b); see also Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 35, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 35, 682
N.W.2d 343, 35 ("[T]he initial burden is on the employee to prove that a reasonable
accommodation is available .... ).
23. Crystal Lake, 2003 WI 106, 32, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 32, 664 N.W.2d 651,132.
24. § 111.34(l)(b).
25. See Currie, 565 N.W.2d at 258.
26. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations have defined "reasonable
accommodation" under the ADA as a modification or adjustment to a job, the work environment, or
the way things usually are done that enables a qualified individual with a disability to enjoy an equal
employment opportunity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). Examples of reasonable accommodation listed in
the ADA include the following:
(a) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities; and (b) job restructuring, part-time or modified
work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2004). The Wisconsin Legislature has not undertaken efforts to similarly
2006]
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the WFEA does not define them. 7 To understand the terms, one must turn to
the case law interpreting them.
III. A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN WISCONSIN DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW:
CRYSTAL LAKE, HUTCHINSON TECHNOLOGY, AND THE HARDSHIP STANDARD
A. The Decisions
The reasonable accommodation and hardship standards have received a
significant amount of judicial attention in the past few years, beginning with
the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor
& Industry Review Commission.28 At issue in Crystal Lake was whether an
employer could be obligated to accommodate a disabled employee by
modifying the employee's job functions-in other words, by tailoring a job to
fit the employee's abilities.29 In a decision that surprised many employers,
the court held that an employer may be required to change an employee's job
duties in a given circumstance. 30
Nearly one year after its Crystal Lake decision, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court again examined whether an employer reasonably accommodated a
disabled employee in Hutchinson Technology, Inc. v. Labor & Industry
Review Commission.31 In June 1998, Susan Roytek, the plaintiff, began
working twelve-hour shifts in the "photoetch department" of defendant
Hutchinson Technology, Inc., which produces suspension assemblies for
define its "reasonable accommodation" standard.
27. See Wis. STAT. § 111.31-.395 (2003-2004). In contrast to the WFEA, the ADA defines
both "reasonable accommodation" and "hardship"; unfortunately, authors have nevertheless
criticized the ADA for being vague. See Epstein, supra note 3; Ron A. Vassel, Note and Comment,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Cost, Uncertainty and Inefficiency, 13 J.L. & COM. 397
(1994); Lisa A. Lavelle, The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act Emancipate Individuals with Disabilities Only to Disable Small Businesses?, 66 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1135 (1991); Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act: How Much Must One do Before Hardship Turns Undue?, 59 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1311 (1991).
28. Crystal Lake, 2003 WI 106, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651.
29. Id., 2003 WI 106, 22, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 22, 664 N.W.2d 651, 122.
30. Id., 2003 WI 106, 52, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 52, 664 N.W.2d 651, 152; see Tracy L. Haas,
Note, Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor and Industry Review Commission. A Reasonable Turn
Under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act?, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1535, 1572 (2004) ("[T]here will
undoubtedly be much more litigation regarding the extent of the new duty to accommodate
announced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Crystal Lake."). I take a different view of the effect
of the Crystal Lake decision than does Ms. Haas. Because the Crystal Lake decision so significantly
increased an employer's duty to accommodate, that issue likely will be less litigated, not more.
Instead, most post-Crystal Lake litigation likely will center around whether the expansive (but now
permitted) accommodation will work a hardship-not on whether it is reasonable.
31. Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 682 N.W.2d 343.
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computer hard disk drives. 32 Over the span of two weeks, Roytek and her
coworkers would work seven twelve-hour shifts.33  Hutchinson had
determined that the twelve-hour shifts maximized use of its equipment.34
In September 1998, Roytek's personal physician diagnosed her with lower
back pain and advised her to take temporary leave from work.35 In November
1998, Roytek returned to work, but with restrictions; she was limited to
working six-hour days and prohibited from certain physical tasks, which were
among her job duties before her diagnosis.36  Hutchinson temporarily
accommodated her shortened shifts. 37 Roytek continued her six-hour shifts
until January 1999, when she increased her shifts to eight hours.3 8 She never
resumed her twelve-hour shifts. In contrast, Roytek went on short-term
disability leave in August of 1999; Hutchinson terminated her in September
1999, when her short-term disability pay was depleted.3
Shortly thereafter, Roytek filed a disability discrimination complaint with
the Equal Rights Division of the Workforce Development. 40  Roytek and
Hutchinson focused their arguments before the Administrative Law Judge on
whether the eight-hour day would be a reasonable accommodation.4'
Hutchinson argued hardship on several fronts. Hutchinson first argued for
deference towards its business judgments, asserting that a mandatory eight-
hour shift for Roytek strips it of its ability to manage its shift schedules.42
Hutchinson also highlighted concerns that Roytek would have to work under
two different supervisors, making her supervision difficult.43  Further,
Hutchinson claimed that accommodating Roytek's eight-hour schedules
would reduce the plant's efficiency. While these arguments may have been
32. Id. 19 3-4, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 9 3-4, 682 N.W.2d 343, M 3-4.
33. Id. 3, 273 Wis. 2d 394, $ 3, 682 N.W.2d 343, 3.
34. Id. 46, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 46, 682 N.W.2d 343, 46 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).
35. Id. 5, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 5, 682 N.W.2d 343, $ 5 (majority opinion).
36. Id., 273 Wis. 2d 394, 5, 682 N.W.2d 343, 5.
37. Id., 273 Wis. 2d 394, $ 5, 682 N.W.2d 343, 5.
38. Id., 273 Wis. 2d 394, 5, 682 N.W.2d 343, 5.
39. Id., 273 Wis. 2d 394, 5, 682 N.W.2d 343, 5.
40. Id. 6, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 6, 682 N.W.2d 343, 6.
41. Id., 273 Wis. 2d 394, 6,682 N.W.2d 343,$ 6.
42. Id. 25, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 25, 682 N.W.2d 343, 25. For a discussion on the right of
businesses to exercise their business judgment after the recent Wisconsin disability discrimination
decisions, see Haas, supra note 30, at 1565-66 (Crystal Lake "takes away 'the responsibility for
deciding how to structure the workforce to meet business needs from each employer and place[s] it
squarely within a state agency that neither employs the individual in question nor produces the
products or provides the services necessary to do so."').
43. Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 25, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 25, 682 N.W.2d 343, 25.
Hutchinson never explained the difficulties that this situation would impose. Id. 36 n. 18, 273 Wis.
2d 394, T 36 n.18, 682 N.W.2d 343, T 36 n.18.
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compelling in the abstract, the majority noted that Hutchinson did not offer
sufficient statistical data regarding lost profits, production losses, and morale
problems. 44  In fact, the Labor and Industry Review Commission ("LIRC")
concluded that "the asserted production declines, morale problems, and profit
reduction had not yet evidenced themselves. 45
This lack of hard data proved fatal to Hutchinson's defense. The majority
saw little more in Hutchinson's arguments than speculation and conjecture. 46
For example, the majority faulted Hutchinson for not providing "evidence that
other employees sought to work reduced shifts, that morale problems had
arisen among its other employees, or that production had decreased as a result
of Roytek's" part-time status.47 Hutchinson had ten months to assemble
evidence that Roytek's shorter shift caused losses, but it did not.48 Based on
these shortcomings, the court concluded that Hutchinson failed to establish
that it would experience hardship in permanently accommodating Roytek's
eight-hour shifts.49
B. How Crystal Lake and Hutchinson Reformed the Analysis of a
Disability Discrimination Claim
Despite gestures to the contrary, the WFEA has always stacked the deck
in favor of the disabled employeeS°-its principle purpose, after all, is "to
44. Hutchinson claimed that it did not provide this level of information because the eight-hour
shift was intended to be a temporary accommodation only. Id. 25, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 25, 682
N.W.2d 343, 25. It did, however, analyze the effect of Roytek's schedule on equipment use. Id.
49 n.4, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 49 n.4, 682 N.W.2d 343, 49 n.4 (Roggensack, J., dissenting) ("If Roytek
were to work eight-hour shifts five days per week, HTI's equipment would be unused 40 hours every
two weeks or 1,040 hours per year.").
45. Roytek v. Hutchinson Tech., Inc., E.R.D. Case No. 199903917 (L.I.R.C. Jan. 28, 2002).
46. Hutchinson Tech., 2004 W190, 36, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 36, 682 N.W.2d 343, 36.
47. Id., 273 Wis. 2d 394, 36, 682 N.W.2d 343, 36. While there is credence to the court's
statement that Hutchinson failed to meet its burden of proof, the court could not avoid making the
following unwarranted inference: "Clearly, a reasonable accommodation was available since HTI
accommodated Roytek's eight-hour shifts for eight months without any problems." Id. 35, 273 Wis.
2d 394, 1 35, 682 N.W.2d 343, 35 (emphasis added). Despite Hutchinson's failure to carry its
burden of proof in showing "hardship," it is quite unlikely that the eight-hour shift was problem-free
in reality.
48. Roytek v. Hutchinson Tech., Inc., E.R.D. Case No. 199903917 (L.I.R.C. Jan. 28, 2002).
49. Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 34 n.15, 35, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 34 n.15, 35, 682 N.W.2d
343, 34, n. 15, 35 ("HTI has failed to produce any evidence, beyond mere speculation, that it would
experience hardship if it accommodated Roytek. [This case boils down to a failure by the employer]
to satisfy the requisite burden of proof.").
50. Id. 29, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 29, 682 N.W.2d 343, 29 ("We are mindful that a business
must have the right to set its own employment rules to encourage maximum productivity." However,
employment rules that encourage maximum productivity "must bend to the requirements of the
WFEA."); Haas, supra note 30, at 1565 ("The policy behind the WFEA, to ensure employment of all
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encourage and foster to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all
properly qualified individuals regardless of. . disability."5  After Crystal
Lake, disabled employees are further advantaged at employers' expense. The
court all but dropped the modifier "reasonable" from the reasonable
accommodation standard when it concluded that an employer seeking to
comply with the WFEA might need to modify an existing job to accommodate
a disabled employee.5 2 Because Crystal Lake potentially strips employers of
the right to define job duties,53 proving that an accommodation is not
"reasonable" is a feat that many employers may find impossible. Hardship is
the new battleground.
Although the rights for disabled individuals are strong, they are far from
immutable. The courts have apparently sought to protect the interests of
employers as well. 54 The Hutchinson court repeatedly asserted that, while it
was "mindful that a business must have the right to set its own employment
rules to encourage maximum productivity[,] such rules do not exist in a
vacuum, but must bend to the requirements of the WFEA." 55 The dissent in
Hutchinson, on the other hand, argued that the majority's assurances ring
hollow.56
As of 2004, the Hutchinson case represents the most significant
development in the analysis of hardship.5 7  Even so, its significance is
circumspect. The Hutchinson court did not reveal a useful test or synthesize
precedent; indeed, Wisconsin case law continues to lack a framework for
defining hardship. 58 This Comment strives to provide that framework by
properly qualified disabled individuals regardless of disability, is by all means necessary.").
51. WIS. STAT § 111.31(3) (2003-2004).
52. See Haas, supra note 30, at 1565-66 (questioning whether the Crystal Lake decision
represented a reasonable interpretation of the WFEA).
53. Crystal Lake, 2003 WI 106, 1 86, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 86, 664 N.W.2d 651, 86 (Prosser, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he court has taken from Wisconsin employers the ability to define the required job
duties of their employees.").
54. Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 29, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 29, 682 N.W.2d 343, 29.
55. Id., 273 Wis. 2d 394, 29, 682 N.W.2d 343, 29.
56. Id. 7 71, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 71, 682 N.W.2d 343, 71 (Roggensack, J., dissenting). Justice
Roggensack argued that the majority decision in Hutchinson failed to recognize the right employers
should have to manage business to achieve maximum productivity. Id. Relating her criticism to the
specific facts of the case, Justice Roggensack maintained that employers such as Hutchinson would
now be unable to make universally mandatory a requirement that employees work twelve-hour shifts
when a disabled employee cannot work those hours. Id. While her criticism is valid, it is
circumspect-the ability to always set mandatory hours requirements is not all employers lost after
Hutchinson.
57. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not offered a more detailed examination of "hardship"
since this case. Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 77 20-36, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 77 20-36, 682 N.W.2d
343, T$ 20-36 ("hardship" analysis).
58. Brief for Wis. Cheese Makers Ass'n, and Wis. Mfr. & Commerce, Inc. as Amici Curiae
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setting forth analysis of LIRC decisions and providing principles that can be
derived from them. The analysis starts with LIRC decisions pre-Hutchinson.
C. Pre-Hutchinson LIRC Decisions
1. Gartner v. Hilldale, Inc.
In Gartner v. Hilldale, Inc.,59 Gartner worked as an office manager for a
corporation that managed the Hilldale shopping center in Madison. Her job
duties included bookkeeping and managing office records. Shortly after being
involved in a car accident, Gartner was advised to work half time, but it was
unclear how long this condition would last.60  To accommodate Gartner's
disability, Hilldale allowed her to work half time, and it hired another person
to work half time to cover Gartner's duties.6 ' When Hilldale discovered that
Gartner's condition was indefinite, however, it terminated her; Gartner filed a
complaint for disability discrimination.
62
LIRC considered whether Hilldale had proven that the proposed
accommodation-two half-time positions-posed a hardship. Hilldale argued
that the accommodation would create communications problems, payroll
costs, and other inefficiencies when two part-time employees would
accomplish the duties associated with one full-time employee.63 However,
Hilldale offered no persuasive evidence of any problems or inefficiencies
caused by the use of two part-time employees, and it did not offer evidence
concerning the payroll cost differences between the two situations-it merely
offered speculation.64 Based on this lack of proof, LIRC concluded that
"speculation that [hardship] might occur is inadequate. 65
Supporting Petitioner, Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 2003 WI 106,
204 Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651 (No. 02-9815) ("No Wisconsin caselaw provides a framework for
defining a 'hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business' under Wis. STAT. §
11 1.34(1)(b).").
59. Gartner v. Hilldale, Inc., E.R.D. Case No. 9001109 (L.I.R.C. May 12, 1992).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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2. Janocik v. Heiser Chevrolet
Janocik v. Heiser6 6 represents an instance where an employer failed to
show hardship because the evidence offered was too speculative. Janocik had
diabetes and received a kidney transplant, after which he took leave from
work.67 He was rehired in his former position as a service advisor two years
after taking leave, but he told his employer that there was a chance his body
would reject the kidney.68 Complications eventually arose, and Janocik
underwent further surgery. 69 While in the hospital, Heiser terminated his
employment because it believed his absences had an adverse effect on its
business. 70  Thereafter, Janocik filed a complaint for disability
discrimination.7 1
LIRC focused on whether a leave of absence, which Heiser did not
provide, would pose a hardship on Heiser's business.72 Heiser argued that a
prolonged leave of absence would pose a hardship, since going without a
service advisor would adversely affect its sales and its ability to provide
customer service.73  However, LIRC was not convinced that this
accommodation would pose a hardship for several reasons. First, to the extent
the proposed accommodation would pose a hardship, Heiser did not offer any
less costly alternatives, such as filling the position on a short-term basis.74
Second, another Heiser service advisor had been filling in for Janocik, and
Heiser did not provide any costs associated with this arrangement.75
Ultimately, LIRC concluded that Heiser's arguments were too speculative:
"while the law does not require an employer to consider and reject every
conceivable means of accommodating an employe's [sic] handicap, an
employer cannot avoid liability under the [WFEA] merely by explaining that
being short-staffed adversely affects its business, a proposition which
generally goes without saying., 76
66. Janocik v. Heiser Chevrolet, E.R.D. Case No. 9350310 (L.I.R.C. Nov. 21, 1994).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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3. Fields v. Cardinal T G. Co.
In Fields v. Cardinal T G. Co.,77 LIRC was not satisfied with the
employer's showing of hardship.78 Fields began working for Cardinal in the
glass tempering plant. 79 The job had many physical tasks, including loading
and unloading glass, but the job (for Fields as well as all similarly situated
employees) also included rotation among less physically demanding tasks. 80
After Fields injured his back in a car accident, his doctor recommended that
he alter his job duties every two hours, limit lifting to thirty-five pounds, and
avoid frequent twisting.8' After limited discussions regarding potential
accommodations, Cardinal placed Fields on paid leave, from which he was
not rehired.82 Fields filed a disability discrimination complaint. 83
Fields proposed the following accommodations: 1) an exemption from
glass loading and unloading duties; or 2) a transfer to another plant, which had
positions better-suited to Fields' abilities. 84 Cardinal countered, arguing that
the reassignment of loading and unloading duties would have increased the
risk of repetitive motion injuries for other workers, harmed morale, reduced
flexibility, and lowered productivity.
85
None of these alleged hardships persuaded LIRC. Cardinal failed to prove
that reassigning physically demanding duties would significantly increase
risks for other employees; while Cardinal described that it formed its rotation
policy based on two "ergonomic reports," it did not offer any site-specific
evidence on whether the reassignment of tasks would endanger other
workers.86 LIRC implored Cardinal to offer some expert evidence, because
"the effect of removing a single person from a large-scale rotation is not
something that a lay person has the expertise to evaluate.,
87
Cardinal also failed to prove that reassigning Fields would harm plant
morale; in fact, quite the opposite was the case. 88 While Cardinal argued that
workers would question Fields' special rotation, LIRC found that workers
77. Id.
78. Fields v. Cardinal T.G. Co., E.R.D. Case No. 199702574 (L.I.R.C. Feb. 16, 2001).
79. Id.
80. In fact, Cardinal had eliminated its positions that involved solely light-duty work. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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generally disliked the tasks to which Fields was reassigned, even if they were
less physically demanding.89 Cardinal offered no direct testimony from an
employee to the contrary. 90
Turning to the issue of flexibility, Cardinal had argued that it relied on
cross-trained workers to increase flexibility; relegating Fields to the quench
facility would have arguably decreased the opportunity for its workers to be
cross-trained. However, Cardinal specifically admitted that this opportunity
still existed. 91 For these reasons, LIRC found that Cardinal had not proven
hardship. 92
4. Kinion v. Portage Community Schools
In Kinion v. Portage Community Schools,9 3 the employer uniquely was
successful in proving hardship. Kinion worked with Portage schools as one of
two secretaries for the exceptional education needs program. 94 Three years
after starting work, Kinion began a series of medical leaves for severe
depression associated with panic disorder, which she claimed arose from her
relationship with her supervisor, Cummings.95 The disorder was diagnosed as
being incapacitating, and her doctor estimated that it would last for six to
eight weeks. 96 After an extended period of medical leave with no reliable
indication that she would be able to return, Portage Schools terminated
Kinion.
97
Kinion argued that Portage Schools should have accommodated her in the
following ways: 1) by assigning Kinion and Cummings to different locations;
2) by allowing Kinion to work from home; 3) by assigning Kinion's position
to a different supervisor; and 4) by transferring Kinion to a different
position.
98
LIRC concluded that separating Kinion and Cummings would have
imposed a hardship on Portage Schools. 99 Their resources were in the same
89. According to LIRC, very few people were "interested in working the quench furnace
because it is boring and hot." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Kinion v. Portage Comty. Schs., E.R.D. Case No. CR200003066 (L.I.R.C. Sep. 19, 2003).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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place; Portage Schools showed that Kinion and Cummings needed to work
where the special education files were located in order to do their jobs
effectively.' 00 Further, the work files that Kinion needed were confidential
and were not permitted to be removed from the work site. Similarly, with
specialized training she had received, Cummings was the only supervisor
qualified to supervise Kinion in the exceptional educational needs program.101
As a result, Portage Schools had put forth sufficient evidence that it would
have posed a hardship on Portage Schools for Kinion to work in a different
location, to work at home, or to work under a different supervisor. 1
02
5. Parker v. Dane County
In Parker v. Dane County,10 3 LIRC again found that an employer was
unable to prove hardship. Parker was employed as an Account Clerk in the
County Clerk's Office, where contact with the general public is a primary job
duty.' °4 Parker also suffered from a severe (and progressively worsening)
hearing loss in both ears. 1
05
As an accommodation, Parker sought removal of phone duties from the
clerk position, either alone or in combination with the use of voice mail,
email, and a voice recognition technology. Dane County argued that
eliminating the phone duties from Parker's position would be a hardship
because the other two clerks would need to field all calls. 106 In support of this
argument, Dane County offered statistics showing the number of calls per
week, the number to which each staff member had traditionally responded,
and the number that each staff member would receive if Parker's job duties
were reassigned. 10 7  LIRC did not believe that the increase in calls-an
average of 1.5 per hour-would be significant, because most calls required
the employee to redirect the caller, not a substantive response.1
08
Dane County also maintained that reassigning the phone duties would
cause a morale problem. 109 This argument failed for two reasons. First, Dane
County offered hearsay to support this point, and LIRC properly called this
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Parker v. Dane County, E.R.D. Case No. 199902779 (L.I.R.C. Nov. 10, 2003).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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evidence incompetent. 110  Second, and perhaps more importantly, LIRC
questioned whether morale is a prescient concern: "although office harmony
is a laudable management goal and a legitimate consideration here, the goals
of the WFEA would not be served if disgruntled co-workers could block
reasonable accommodations simply by expressing objection.""'
D. Post-Hutchinson LIRC Decisions
1. Walsh v. Tom A. Rothe S.C.
112
LIRC is capable of finding hardship post-Hutchinson. Rothe S.C.'s
financial situation required that it reduce its workforce. 1 13 Walsh was a staff
accountant for Rothe and had a disability that Rothe had accommodated for
several months. 114 Specifically, Rothe made physical modifications to the
worksite and delegated Walsh's data entry tasks to another accountant. "5
Together, these accommodations allowed Walsh "to work to the best of his
ability."' 116
Despite these accommodations, however, Walsh was by far the least
productive staff accountant. 1 7 Rothe was struggling financially and was
required to reduce its workforce; therefore, efficiency was a paramount
concern in its decisions about whom to terminate. The only accommodation
that Rothe could have provided, given its financial situation, would have been
to fire a more productive accountant and retain Walsh. 118
LIRC found that this business decision would work a hardship on Rothe.
Unlike in Hutchinson, where the employer failed to articulate the costs that
the accommodations would have on the business's productivity, Rothe
successfully demonstrated: 1) Walsh's inefficiency, 2) the business's
precarious financial situation, and 3) the significant costs the proposed
accommodation would have on the business.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Walsh v. Tom A. Rothe S.C., E.R.D. Case No. 200000848 (L.I.R.C. Nov. 19, 2004).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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2. Wickstrom v. Hutchinson Technology, Inc.
The Roytek dispute" 9 did not represent Hutchinson's last appearance
before LIRC. In Wickstrom v. Hutchinson Technology, Inc., 2° Hutchinson
again encountered an employee, Wickstrom, who sought an eight-hour
workday while other similarly situated employees worked twelve-hour
shifts.' 2' Hutchinson argued that it would be expensive to train a new
employee to work the remainder of Wickstrom's shift. 2 2 Hutchinson also
argued that using two employees for one shift would cause problems of
communications between shifts. 123  Finally, Hutchinson argued that the
accommodation would cause morale problems. 124  Like in its previous
decisions, LIRC was not persuaded by these arguments. 
25
E. Observations from the Hardship Decisions: Employers Must Present More
Than Mere Speculation
The Hutchinson decision, other cases, and LIRC decisions interpreting the
WFEA's hardship standard teach a few lessons for employers. First,
employers have the burden of proving hardship if it is looking not to
accommodate a disabled employee. Second, to prove hardship, an employer
must walk a fine line-it must accommodate the employee and gather
evidence of costs. However, this strategy has its risks: the longer the
employer accommodates the employee, the more likely a court is to conclude
the accommodation does not pose a hardship. Each of these lessons is
discussed in further detail below.
The employer has the burden of showing that it cannot accommodate the
employee's disability without hardship.126  The question of whether an
119. Roytek v. Hutchinson Tech., Inc., E.R.D. Case No. 199903917 (L.I.R.C. Jan. 28, 2002);
see also Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 2004 WI 90, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 682
N.W.2d 343.
120. Wickstrom v. Hutchinson Tech., Inc., E.R.D. Case No. 200000848 (L.I.R.C. Nov. 19,
2004).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. The court noted the following:
Once the employee meets the initial burden of proving that he or she has a
disability .... the employer then has the burden of proving a defense under Wis.
Stat. § 111.34. We stated that § 11 1.34(1)(b) and (2)(a) require an employer to
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accommodation works a hardship on the employer is a factual determination
that must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
127
One stark pattern emerges from the case-by-case analysis: employers must
be aware that the accommodations that they provide can be held against them.
In Target Stores v. Labor & Industry Review Commission, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals held that the employer violated the WFEA by terminating an
employee while she was seeking treatment for a temporary, but disabling,
condition-temporary forbearance was the reasonable accommodation.
128
The Hutchinson court took the Target holding one step farther; not only must
an employer temporarily accommodate an employee, the reasonableness of a
temporary accommodation is evidence of the reasonableness of the
accommodation on a permanent basis. 129
Given this development, an employer might conclude that it is safer to
refuse to accommodate the employee in the first instance-if an employer
does not temporarily accommodate, no accommodation can be held against it
if the employee seeks a permanent accommodation. 130 However, the
Hutchinson opinion should advise against this approach. Because an
employer is hard pressed to effectively argue hardship without documenting
the costs that an employer actually incurs in providing an accommodation,
and because hardship is the new battleground in a disability discrimination
prove that even with reasonable accommodations, the employee would not be
able to perform his or her job responsibilities adequately or that, where
reasonable accommodations would enable the employee to do the job, hardship
would be placed on the employer.
Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 2004 WI 90, 1 32, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 32,
682 N.W.2d 343, 32 (citations omitted).
127. McMullen v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 434 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
128. 576 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
129. Justice Roggensack identified this dilemma in her dissent:
[T]he majority uses HTI's forbearance from termination... against HTI. This
puts employers between the proverbial rock and a hard place: Target requires an
employer to wait a reasonable time when an employee is being treated to resolve
a medical condition and the majority opinion herein concludes that an employer
who waits to see if a medical condition will resolve, will have that used against
it, if the condition becomes permanent and the employee is fired.
Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 69, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 69, 682 N.W.2d 343, 69 (Roggensack, J.,
dissenting).
130. LIRC has imposed limits on whether an employer must accommodate an employee by
allowing leave from work. For example, in Janocik v. Heiser Chevrolet, E.R.D. Case No. 9350310
(L.I.R.C. Nov. 21, 1994), LIRC held that a reasonable accommodation does not include keeping a
job open for an employee who has been away from work with no foreseeable return date. Similarly,
in Lewankdowski v. Galland Henning Nopak, Inc., E.R.D. Case No. 199603884 (L.I.R.C. Jan. 28,
1999), LIRC held that an employer cannot reasonably be expected to hold a job open indefinitely
when there is no indication that an employee will return to work.
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suit, an employer must accommodate to build its defense. After Hutchinson,
disability discrimination cases will turn on whether the employer can quantify
hardship, and convince a court that it is undue.
Employers should also recognize another pattern in the hardship
decisions: courts will vigorously scrutinize an employer's evidence. Courts
have required employers to show hardship through documentary evidence and
non-hearsay testimony. Speculation and conjecture are insufficient. Because
Hutchinson failed to offer "statistical data regarding lost profits, production
losses, and morale problems,"' 3 1 the court concluded that "[t]he hypothetical
difficulties associated with permanent part-time status for the complainant are
simply too speculative to meet the respondent's burden of proof in the
matter."' 32  The natural inference from this conclusion is that such non-
speculative, hard evidence may be required to show hardship.
The LIRC decisions illustrate this point well. Among the seven decisions
cited above, five-Gartner, Janocik, Fields, Parker, and Wickstrom-turned
in large measure on the employer's failure sufficiently to prove hardship. One
lesson that these decisions teach is that, to prove hardship, an employer must
develop site-specific evidence that the proposed accommodation not only will
work a hardship on the business, but already has worked a hardship on the
business.
For example, in Walsh, the employer provided evidence that its business
was in a "tenuous financial situation."' 33 The employer also provided specific
evidence that Walsh, the disabled employee, was by far its least productive
employee-a cost that the business could not have absorbed, given its
situation. 134 In this context, LIRC was not prepared to require the employer
to fire a more productive employee and retain Walsh, the disabled
employee. 13
5
Contrast this decision with those decisions where the employer did not
translate the proposed accommodation into a cognizable hardship. To make a
successful showing of hardship, the employer should provide site-specific
evidence, and that evidence must be persuasive. Some employers have a
difficulty providing site-specific evidence. The employer in Hutchinson had
this shortcoming,' 36 as did other employers.
Site-specific evidence might not always satisfy an employer's burden,
however. Even if an employer provides site-specific evidence, the employer
must make sure that evidence is persuasive. For example, in Parker, the
131. Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 25,273 Wis. 2d 394, 25, 682 N.W.2d 343, 25.
132. Id. 1 36, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 36, 682 N.W.2d 343, 36.
133. Walsh v. Tom A. Rothe S.C., E.R.D. Case No. 200000848 (L.I.R.C. Nov. 19, 2004).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 36, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 36, 682 N.W.2d 343, 36.
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employer offered statistical evidence showing how the proposed
accommodation in that case would increase the workload for the other
employees.13 ' However, the increase would have been slight-only 1.5
telephone calls per day per employee.138 Although statistical evidence is
something a court tends to value, 139 even the best statistical evidence could
not have made this employer's case compelling. Similarly, the employer in
Janocik argued that being short-staffed would adversely affect its business-a
conclusion that, according to LIRC, "goes without saying."' 140  This was
another situation where an employer failed to produce compelling evidence.
The decisions also teach that the morale of other employees is of minimal
concern when determining whether a proposed accommodation would work a
hardship on the employer. This argument has surfaced in most of the
decisions cited above, and it has been dispensed with in different ways. For
example, some decisions pay tribute to the effect that employee moral would
have, but criticize the way in which the evidence is presented. Regardless of
how the court dispenses with the argument, it remains apparent that morale is
not a persuasive concern in determining whether an accommodation would
work a hardship on the employer.
For these reasons, it is clear that if an employer waits until the eve of trial
to build its defense to a disability discrimination case, it will have waited far
too long.
IV. THE BATTLE OVER HARDSHIP: GUIDANCE FOR FURTHER DEVELOPING
THE HARDSHIP STANDARD IN WISCONSIN
In addition to preparing employers for their evidentiary burden, this
Comment seeks to provide ways in which employers can advocate favorable
interpretations of the hardship standard. Analyzing whether an
accommodation would work a hardship on an employer in Wisconsin has
been difficult. As the totality-of-the-circumstances LIRC decisions cited
above demonstrate, the courts have been reluctant to develop a test for
evaluating whether an accommodation would present a hardship. Without a
test, the definition of hardship lacks clarity. Also, employers have been
required to undergo hardship in order to prove it. This phenomenon runs
counter to the WFEA's language and should be remedied.
137. Parker v. Dane County, E.R.D. Case No. 199902779 (L.I.R.C. Nov. 10, 2003).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 36, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 36, 682 N.W.2d 343,
36 (faulting the employer for not providing specific evidence of hardship).
140. Janocik v. Heiser Chevrolet, E.R.D. Case No. 9350310 (L.I.R.C. Nov. 21, 1994).
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A. Discontinuing "Case-by-Case "Analysis in Favor of Increased Clarity
Since the McMullen v. Labor & Industry Review Commission decision,
the question of whether a particular accommodation works a hardship on a
specific employer has been a factual determination to be addressed on a case-
by-case basis. 14 1 Contrary to the court's belief that disability discrimination
cases should be decided in nearly every respect on a case-by-case basis,
however, the courts should strive to develop generally applicable rules of law
in making its decisions. Admittedly, much of the virtue of the WFEA is its
flexibility, with its provisions "liberally construed" to encourage "to the
fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly qualified individuals
regardless of. . . disability."'142  But courts should take strides to prevent
flexibility from becoming the handmaiden of vagueness; flexibility is hardly
commendable if it means imposing unpredictable obligations on employers
and employees. Case-by-case analysis is dangerous for litigants and non-
litigants alike; not only does limiting decisions "to the facts of that case"
allow courts to engage in ad hoc judgments, the practice also muddies law in
acute need of clarification.
While the provisions in the WFEA have been open to interpretation for
nearly a quarter of a century, the courts continually refuse to add analytic
depth to the WFEA. 143 This behavior is regrettable in at least two respects.
141. 434 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) ("Although a requested accommodation is
reasonable, it may nonetheless work a hardship on a specific employer for various reasons. This, too,
is a factual determination that must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.").
142. WIS. STAT. § 111.31(3) (2003-2004).
143. See, e.g., Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 2003 WI 106,
52 n.19, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 52 n.19, 664 N.W.2d 651, 52 n.19 (interpreting the adequate
undertaking requirements of section 111.34(2)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes, the Crystal Lake
majority wrote, "[t]he dissent attempts to lead us into a trap" to conclude whether the statute requires
an employee "to perform 'some' as opposed to 'most' or 'all' job responsibilities. The proper
emphasis is on the employee's ability to perform her or his job responsibilities adequately, rather
than on terms such as 'some' or 'most' or 'all."') (citations omitted); Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v.
Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 2002 WI App 290, 28 n.5, 258 Wis. 2d 414, 28 n.5, 654 N.W.2d
286, 28 n.5 ("LIRC makes its determination of what constitutes a 'reasonable accommodation' on
the facts of each case. Therefore, the result in this case does not necessarily create a broad rule for
subsequent cases.") (citations omitted), affd, Crystal Lake, 2003 WI 106, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664
N.W.2d 651. The court noted the following:
[T]he specific considerations as to what composes a reasonable accommodation
will have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. [W]e are unwilling to adopt a
rule of law that [the proposed accommodation in the case] is always
unreasonable. This determination is fact sensitive and is not subject to
sweeping propositions of law.
McMullen, 434 N.W.2d at 833. Similarly, LIRC noted:
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First, from an analytic perspective, no provision in the text requires the courts
to insist on ad hoc terminations-the limitation of decisions to a case's unique
facts is a court-created preference. Second, and as a corollary to the first, the
vague reasonable accommodation and hardship standards harm the very
individuals they were designed to protect-namely, disabled workers-by
hampering negotiation, increasing the likelihood for litigation, and ultimately
straining relationships between employers and disabled employees. In short,
the prevalent interpretations of the WFEA disability discrimination provisions
are both erroneous and counterproductive.
To this end, the courts should break the habit of confining decisions to the
particular facts in a given case. Many arguments compel this change. For
example, to the extent that case-by-case analysis prevents the court from
developing the undeniably vague provisions of the WFEA, the risk of ad hoc
judgments is readily apparent. 144 Also, the court's adherence to case-by-case
analysis is neither strict nor pure; the courts continue to distinguish and
analogize 145 cases to ground, somewhat, in precedent the decision at bar.
Thus, case-by-case analysis is, at best, a loose principle to which the courts
adhere in only the most superficial way, and at worst, a mechanism by which
the court can escape the implications of each prior decision it has made.
Either way, the doctrine demands serious reconsideration.
To the extent courts have defined hardship through decisions where
hardship was in issue, cases have been confined to their facts, thereby
stripping the decisions of much of their precedential value. Thus, without a
definite test, and without a court system that is committed to its precedent,
each court considering a hardship case is potentially able to work on a blank
slate. This is troubling methodology. The courts should take responsibility to
decide cases in light of precedent-not despite it.
[T]he duty of accommodation should be broadly interpreted to resolve the
problem it was designed to address, and should be liberally construed to
effectuate the policy and purpose of the Fair Employment Act of encouraging
and fostering to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly
qualified individuals regardless of handicap. [I]t is inappropriate to conclude as
a matter of law that any particular kind of action is not required as an
accommodation.
Gartner v. Hilldale, Inc., E.R.D. Case No. 9001109 (L.I.R.C. May 12, 1992) (citations omitted).
144. Compare Crystal Lake, 2003 WI 106, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651, with Harris v.
DHSS, Wis. Pers. Comm., No. 84-0109, at 180-82 (Feb. 11, 1988).
145. See, e.g., Crystal Lake, 2003 WI 106, 48-50, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 48-50, 664 N.W.2d
651, 48-50 (analogizing the disabled employee's case with the disabled employees in Target, 576
N.W.2d 545, McMullen, 434 N.W.2d 830, and the pre-"reasonable accommodation" case, Frito-Lay,
Inc. v. Wis. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm 'n, 290 N.W.2d 551 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)).
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B. Employers Should Not Have to Undergo Hardship to Prove It
As the Hutchinson decision indicates, employers will find proving
hardship very difficult without having undergone hardship. The employer
there failed to prove hardship because it did not track the costs incurred in
providing an accommodation. The necessary implication from this holding is
that Hutchinson should have undergone and documented its hardship before it
could prove its case. 146
However, the language of the WFEA does not require employers to
endure such expenses. Quite to the contrary, the WFEA contemplates the
type of "hypothetical" arguments that the Hutchinson court abhorred.
Specifically, the statute does not require employers to provide an
accommodation if it "would pose a hardship on the employer's program,
enterprise or business."' 147 "Would" has the following definitions: "Used in
the main clause of a conditional statement to express a possibility or
likelihood .... Used to express presumption or expectation . . . . Used to
indicate uncertainty." 148  The use of the word "would" implies that a
hypothetical inquiry is contemplated, but such an inquiry is exactly what the
courts have prohibited.
Thus, by interpretation of the plain language of the statute, employers
should not have to undergo hardship to prove it as a defense.
V. CONCLUSION
The WFEA was created to strike a healthy balance between employer and
employee interests in accommodating disabled employees into the workforce.
The act set forth general principles of law under which the relationship
between employer and disabled employee would be governed. However, the
relationship set out in the act is incomplete-it is good on ideas but lacking in
specifics.
Since the Crystal Lake decision, which expanded those accommodations
that could be considered "reasonable," more emphasis is placed on whether
such accommodations would work a hardship on the employer. Hardship is
146. There is an exception to this trend, identified in Walsh v. Tom A. Rothe S.C., E.R.D. Case
No. 200000848 (L.I.R.C. Nov. 19, 2004). If an employer provides an accommodation, but its
tenuous financial position requires a change in its workforce, a court may find that the
accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer. Id.
147. WIS. STAT. § 111.34 (1)(b) (2003-2004) (emphasis added).
148. Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=would (last visited Jan. 25,
2006).
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the new battleground.
However, this term is insufficiently defined. This lack of specificity hurts
employers most directly, because it makes crafting an effective defense to a
discrimination claim difficult. Employees suffer as well. Specifics-cogent
definitions, established duties, and clear rights-are crucial to facilitating
negotiation and allowing disabilities to be accommodated without subjecting
the parties to high litigation costs and uncertain results. Wisconsin courts and
agencies continue to apply the WFEA's provisions without developing the
necessary underlying standards, and LIRC decisions provide only limited
guidance-they are not substantially controlling in the court system. Until the
courts define hardship in a meaningful way, defending a disability
discrimination claim will continue to truly be some hardship.
ALEXANDER W. HANSCH
* * *
